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By Dr. Albert Borgmann
Department of Philosophy
The University of Montana
I
have known the burdens and pleas-
ures of lawyering for a long time,
second-hand, to be sure, but closely
all the same.  Our daughter Caitlin has
worked at Davis Polk and for the ACLU
and now teaches law at the City University of New York.  Our
son-in-law, John Lovi, is partner at the New York office of
Steptoe & Johnson.  Many of my students have become
lawyers and have told me of their experiences.  
Technology is a topic I have thought and written about for a
very long time.1 These two currents, technology and the law,
have been running through my life side by side until in the
summer of 2007 Mark Parker, a former student and now an
attorney in Billings, brought about a confluence when he invit-
ed me to talk about technology and the law with present and
former officers of the State Bar of Montana.  
In the fall of 2007, eight of us met for dinner at the home of
Patti and Jock Schulte.2 I was primed for the occasion by what
I had learned from Caitlin, John, and my students, particularly
from Don Harris, also an attorney in Billings, and by half a
dozen articles from law journals that Don had sent me.3 The
dinner was as convivial as it was instructive.  
Lawyers are conflicted and confused about the role technol-
ogy plays in their lives, and their attempts at clarification that
I’m familiar with have been thoughtful for the most part, but
not successful.  Most lawyers do understand that technology
can be a problem either as the subject or as the background of
their practice.  It’s their subject when they litigate issues of
electronic surveillance or copyright infringements on the
Internet.  It’s the background of their practice when they use a
computer, a cell phone, or PowerPoint. 
MY CONCERN HERE IS with technology as the back-
ground or context of the practice of the law.  But even when
this is understood, the force of technology typically escapes
comprehension in two ways.  It unravels into particular prob-
lems – how to deal with e-mail or with videoconferencing or
with tracking billable hours.  Or technology is declared to be
just a tool, and we simply have to learn how to use it.  The
problem on that view is no longer technology, it’s our attitude.4
It is crucial to understand that to cope with technology in a
conscious and conscientious way we need to recognize it as a
coherent phenomenon.  As such it could be called something
other than “technology” – “the dominant culture” or “the tem-
perament of our times.” But “technology” is a helpful term
because it recalls and gathers the technological devices and
procedures that are characteristic of contemporary life.  Lately,
the meaning of “technology” has been sharpened to refer to
the most recent and distinctive version of technology, viz., to
information technology, and it’s technology in this sense that
has especially bothered and bewildered lawyers.  
At times I’ll be talking about technology as though it were a
cultural force in its own right and had simply overwhelmed us.
This is nothing more than a convenient and short-hand parl-
ance for the comprehensive approach to reality that most of us
have implicitly agreed upon, are responsible for, and should
reevaluate. Within this implicit agreement, our attitudes are
overwhelmed by the regime we have agreed to. Hence we
need to make the agreement explicit, and we have to reform it.
A reform, as I will argue, has to be a collective enterprise.  It’s
crucial, then, for philosophical reflections on technology and
the law to be guided by an incisive and comprehensive under-
standing of technology, but it’s just as important for philoso-
phers to meet people, lawyers in this case, where they actually
live, amidst their actual confusions and hopes.  There is no
sense in doing what philosophers do all too often – answer
questions that no one has asked except fellow philosophers.  
So before I launch into what I take to be the law, technolo-
gy, and the connections between them, I want to list the con-
cerns that lawyers appear to have about technology in that
broad cultural sense.  There are pleasures as well as plaints. As
for pleasures, the older generation that has lived through the
change from typewriters to word processors recalls the horrors
of having to modify a long already-typed document, the time
and labor it took secretaries to type the whole thing again,
often under the pressure of time.  These old-timers were
delighted with the ease and instantaneity of word processing.  
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from the University of Munich (Germany). Since 1970 he
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“Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life,”
“Crossing the Postmodern Divide,” and “Holding on to
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Similarly, there is praise for the availability of materials
through Westlaw, Lexis, Nexis, and others not only spatially in
that lawyers can now have instantly on their computers what
once was miles away or entirely inaccessible, but also struc-
turally in that material can be collected, sorted, and compared
in seconds when previously that would have required hours.5
And some lawyers look forward to yet more economy, trans-
parency, and efficiency and to yet more assistance from infor-
mation technology.6  This whole  development is sometimes
greeted, with a note of satisfaction, as
the democratization of means among
rich and poor law firms.7
The shadow that falls on these
feelings of liberation and enrichment
comes from complaints about less
comity and more work.8 There is less
social interaction, less mentoring of
neophytes, less mutual acquaintance
and respect. The old collegiality, to be
sure, was based in part on homogene-
ity of gender, race, and class. But the
greater inclusion of women and
minorities could have enriched comi-
ty, and we need to understand why
the opposite came to pass. Meanwhile
work has been expanding into all the
spaces and crevices of life, reducing
time for family and leisure.  At the
same time the quality of work is
thought to have become thinner, more specialized and more
stereotyped.9
TO UNDERSTAND what is both enhanced and imperiled
by technology, we have to have a rough agreement on what is
meant here by the law.  It’s the legal profession and its obliga-
tions that are at issue.  In the common understanding, a profes-
sion contrasts with a business, at least in degree if not in kind.
A profession is typically self-regulating, committed to rational
procedures, and entrusted by society with a precious good –
physicians with health, teachers with education, and lawyers
with justice. A business is regulated by the law of supply and
demand.  It uses all legally admissible methods to sell what
can be sold and in the process to maximize profits.  A crucial
consequence of these differences is the way people are dealt
with by business people and by professionals.  For business,
people are customers.  For the professions, people are patients,
students, and clients.  A customer tells the business person
what to do.  A doctor tells the patient what to do.  
Isn’t that patronizing? What about an individual’s autono-
my? Very often, when someone comes to see a lawyer, he is
distressed and confused. Some crucial issue is at stake, and the
client isn’t sure what to do. He has come to look for help, not
to assert his autonomy. The lawyer then takes over the client’s
burden. To be equal to the burden, she needs fortitude, and to
give the right advice, she needs wisdom. Fortitude and wisdom
are virtues as Plato tells us, and virtues, as Aristotle important-
ly adds, are more than talents. They are habits and skills that
have to be gradually acquired and constantly honed. 
Having a courageous and wise advocate is a comfort to the
client. But as the lawyer comforts the client, she must gradual-
ly engage the client and restore his autonomy so he will take
ownership of the course of action and come to be at peace
with the outcome. In business, the customer’s autonomy is
taken for granted from the start. It’s called consumer sover-
eignty. In the professions autonomy often needs to be strength-
ened or repaired.
Wisdom is the ability to see how the world hangs together
in its most important dimensions. In the lawyer’s world, jus-
tice is at the center of that vision. But
a comprehensive vision must include
the understanding that justice borders
on one thing that is less and on anoth-
er that is more than justice.  The con-
cern that ranks lower than justice is
keeping order in society, making sure
that all crucial transactions are clearly
and feasibly spelled out and executed.
Order needs justice, however.  A
totalitarian society can be orderly, but
such an order would be oppressive or
worse.  
In the context of the legal profes-
sion, justice means social justice, and
social justice is the fair distribution of
rights and opportunities.  Rights and
opportunities to what? In dire circum-
stances, the answer is clear – to secu-
rity, food, and shelter.  But as soon as
basic needs and the requirements of civil rights are met, and
already when the needs of health and education are addressed,
the notion of fair distribution is insufficient.  Hence something
more than justice is needed – a vision of the good life to deter-
mine, e.g., what kind and degree of health and education to
secure for everyone; and the guidance of the good life is even
more needed when a society becomes affluent.  
Let me add two points to clarify the issue.  First, the ques-
tion of the good life is not one we may answer.  A society
inevitably does answer it through the social and material insti-
tutions it sets up and has to set up collectively.  Second,
lawyers are not exclusively responsible for what society has
instituted as the good life.  But in being the guardians of jus-
tice, they always work in the penumbra of some vision of the
good life, and their work would become unintelligible without
that vision.  
IT’S TIME TO TRACE the outlines of technology as a
form of life.  I should warn my sponsors and readers that they
may be dismayed to discover how involved and extended the
following account of technology is.  Let them persist, and let
the author fulfill his promise that the account will be helpful in
getting a grip on the perils and prospects of the law.  
For our purposes here, a helpful way of bringing technology
into relief is to sketch it against the backdrop of social justice.
Both technology and justice have their origin in the great liber-
ation we call the Enlightenment.  We think of the
Enlightenment primarily as political liberation – breaking the
hold of monarchy and feudalism and instituting democracies.
Technology as a form of culture began roughly with the
The shadow that falls on
technology’s feelings of lib-
eration and enrichment
comes from complaints
about less comity and more
work. There is less social
interaction, less mentoring
of neophytes, less mutual
acquaintance and respect.
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Enlightenment, and it joined a promise of prosperity to the
promise of liberty.  The plausibility of this joint promise has
largely shielded technology from scrutiny.  Who would defend
servitude and poverty? It’s hard for us to imagine a world
where people would accept being a servant and being poor as
providential burdens they simply had to accept and cope with
as best they could.  To the moral sea-change that has made
servitude and poverty unacceptable, we should respond with
approval and gratitude, and we should dedicate ourselves to
bringing liberty and prosperity to everyone.  
What gets concealed, however, by
these commendable convictions is the
freedom that is characteristic of tech-
nology.  The oppressors and tormen-
tors that technology took on were not
persons or classes but the pains and
burdens of reality – hunger, disease,
and confinement.  The childhood dis-
eases that once were the dispensa-
tions of unfathomable Providence
became intolerable scandals that were
to be met, not with prayer and pious
resignation, but with research, devel-
opment, and vaccination.  Let’s call
the liberation from the pains and bur-
dens of reality technological libera-
tion; and so the great liberation that
inaugurated the modern era was actu-
ally the pursuit of two kinds of free-
dom – political freedom and techno-
logical freedom. 
THE PLAUSIBILITY and, in fact, the moral requirement
of technological liberation has undergone a subtle and fatal
shift that comes to light when held up against the development
of political freedom.  A political liberation movement invari-
ably begins as a demand for rights, and rights are always nega-
tively defined as shackles and obstacles that need to be
removed.  The removal of oppression has for its goal the clear-
ing of space for human flourishing.  Technology parallels this
development in one sense and decisively diverges from it in
another.  Political liberation and technological liberation both
began with a heroic phase, marked by a vigorous and painful
struggle to overcome obvious and intolerable problems.  The
political struggle came to its official conclusion in 1791 with
the Bill of Rights, though that conclusion concealed the ongo-
ing struggles of African-Americans and women, and today of
racial, religious, and sexual minorities.  
And what of the human flourishing that was to validate the
promise of the struggle for rights? Has there been a politics of
human well-being and excellence? The policy that began to
develop early in the 20th Century was one of opportunity
rather than actuality, of political neutrality and individual
choice as regards conceptions of the good life.  But it’s impos-
sible for any society to leave the question of the good life
open.  We have to make collective decisions about social and
material structures all the time, and these structures inevitably
channel the typical course of life, obviously in some cases,
subtly in others.  Technology, having passed through its heroic
phase as politics had, smoothly continued to transform every-
day culture and to fill the vacuum of neutrality that politics
had proclaimed.  It left its heroic endeavors behind and inau-
gurated a novel style of life when liberation came to be under-
stood as disburdenment and prosperity as the enjoyment of
unencumbered pleasures. 
WHAT MAKES THIS DEVELOPMENT so hard to
grasp is the ambiguity of disburdenment.  It moves impercepti-
bly from the righteous via the dubious to the frivolous.  Surely
the burdens of thirst and dust must be
removed by the availability of water,
and not just of water that women
have to lug from some source to their
homes, and not just the availability of
tap water of indifferent taste, but of
sparkling water from Italy and
France, and not just from some big
bottle in your refrigerator at home,
but in little convenient plastic bottles
everywhere and always.  
Or consider the pain of emigrants
departing from Ireland, not to be
heard from on the Emerald Isle for
months, and then only known of from
letters that took a month or more to
cross a continent and an ocean.  What
a relief when airmail became avail-
able and telegrams for urgent occa-
sions.  What burdens were lifted
when long-distance telephones
allowed you actually to talk to your
beloved notwithstanding the panic of getting to the phone, the
need to yell into the receiver, and the knowledge that your
mother in the old country was paying dearly for every minute.
Wouldn’t it be wonderful to be able to reach everyone every-
where all the time, money being of little concern? 
The affluence we see in the availability of water and com-
munication has spread across contemporary culture.  It has
transformed transportation, information, food, and entertain-
ment.  This abundance of commodities has become possible
through the gigantic and sophisticated machinery of technolo-
gy that intellectually reaches from research and development
to marketing, and materially from mines and oil wells to the
shelves of Wal-Mart.  It’s the basis of what we may call the
commodious, as opposed to the heroic, phase of technology.
THE RADICAL TRANSFORMATION of reality that the
rise of machinery and commodity have effected is difficult to
articulate and to clarify for two reasons.  One is the ragged
line of progress between the heroic and the commodious phas-
es of technology that at any one time presents us with neces-
sary and frivolous endeavors side by side.  The other is the
smooth and gradual shift from the reasonable (tap water) to the
extravagant (ubiquitous Perrier).  In any event, the crucial
points are two.  Technology has made our world, first, more
controllable but less intelligible and, second, more affluent but
less engaging.  
These two issues hang together.  The citizens of the affluent
Lawyers are not exclusively
responsible for what society
has instituted as the good
life. But in being the
guardians of justice, they
always work in the penum-
bra of some vision of the
good life, and their work
would become unintelligible
without that vision.
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societies are in control of water.  They know it to be safe and
everywhere and easily available.  But unlike the homesteaders
who had to go to the creek to get water, they don’t know from
where and how their water comes out of their faucets.  And
unlike the emigrant from Ireland who had a conception of how
his mother’s writing got down on paper and the letter from her
mailbox to his, we today don’t know how letters get to be pix-
els and how pixels get from my screen to yours.  
There are two concepts that bring the culture of technology
into relief – commodification and consump-
tion.  Commodification is the means, con-
sumption is the end. 
COMMODIFICATION in a broad cul-
tural sense is the process whereby the bur-
dens of hauling water and putting pen to
paper are lifted from our shoulders and
transferred to the machinery of a utility or
the Internet.  In the process, the cultural
texture of women meeting at the well or
fountain and the habit of gathering one’s
thoughts to express oneself in a unique
hand are torn apart.  Typically, also, what
gets severed from its traditional context
and delivered by the machinery of technol-
ogy becomes available for purchase and
sale.  Drawing something into the market
is in fact the precise economic meaning of
commodification.
The product of commodification is a
commodity, again taken in a broad cultural
sense – an object or a service that is
instantly, ubiquitously, easily, and safely
available.  Business is devoted to the pro-
duction and distribution of commodities.  Given the central
and still growing significance of commodification in our socie-
ty, business is central and growing as well and it tends to colo-
nize the rest of contemporary culture.  
Our working lives are devoted to the maintenance or expan-
sion of the commodifying machinery.  Each of us is competent
in maintaining or improving a few cogs of the machine and
nothing more.  The electrician does not understand what the
chemical engineer does; the accountant knows little about the
skills of a physician.  It’s the genius of economy and technolo-
gy that the cogs smoothly engage one another.  When they fail
to do so, politics comes to the rescue if breathlessly and a little
late as a rule.  
The reward of all this is the abundant availability of com-
modities – useful and inconspicuous ones like tap water and
glamorous and seductive ones like Godiva chocolates.
CONSUMPTION IS THE unencumbered and pleasant
enjoyment of commodities.  Although such refined and effort-
less pleasures seem to be the purest fulfillment of desires, a
lack of seriousness taints consumption.  Work on the machin-
ery always seems to be the more responsible thing to do, and it
delays the likely damning test of whether the end is worthy of
the means, whether consumption vindicates our labor.  The
more serious and driven a person, the greater the portion of
time devoted to the machinery of technology (though the con-
sumption of high-achievers makes up in expense what it lacks
in time).  Recently, social science has demonstrated what
moralists have long been preaching – the pleasures of con-
sumption are perfidious and leave us disappointed only to
seduce us once again.10
THE LAW IS PART of the wider culture, and within it
constitutes a distinctive culture as well.  We should not be sur-
prised that in both regards the law has been
invaded by technology.   Lawyers have
welcomed the liberation from tedious typ-
ing, from time-consuming trips to law
libraries, and from the slowness of commu-
nicating with distant colleagues.  They
have appreciated the convenient riches of
Westlaw and LexisNexis, and some look
forward to yet greater freedoms and avail-
abilities in the practice of law.  But it’s the
graying generation of lawyers that feel
relief and gratitude, the ones who in their
youth had to get water from the creek.  For
the younger generation, laptops and access
to Lexis are as unremarkable as tap water.  
Technology, however, has not only
aided, but also injured the law. The first
injury is the flip side of the benefits of
technology. The commodification of infor-
mation and communication has destroyed
the part of the professional culture that was
enforced by the need to knock on a door or
at least pick up the phone and to go to the
law library of a firm or a county where you
would run into colleagues and engage them
in conversation.  There is a rich and commanding presence in
face-to-face meetings that no electronic replacement can equal,
and such presence is conducive to mutual respect and mental
well-being.  The commodious availability of electronic infor-
mation and communication has not only eliminated actual
encounters with colleagues but also infected what encounters
are still left.  Furtive consultations of Blackberrys and the like
at actual meetings have degraded the attention and respect col-
leagues pay one another. 
THE SECOND INJURY comes from an unfortunate con-
vergence of the machinery and the commodity, i.e., the means
and the end of technology. The machinery of technology has
given lawyers more control over their work. Sometimes that
power is used on associates to enforce large amounts of work
by tracking their billable hours.  But as often, the control and
the maximizing it encourages are self-imposed. Lawyers gravi-
tate toward work because of the uncertain value of the end of
technology – of consumption – and the obvious seriousness
and gravity of devotion to the machinery of technology –
work. Here too they are encouraged by the ever-ready means
of information and communication, and such means can be
More TECHNOLOGY AND LAW, Page 32
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instantly and ubiquitously available only if they do not depend
on the actual presence of colleagues or clients. Such availabili-
ty, again, favors the much-lamented social isolation of lawyers.
THE THIRD AND FINAL INJURY is inflicted on the
profession by the affinity of technology with business and the
consequent threat of the commercialization of the law.
Sometimes that danger takes the form of seemingly reasonable
proposals. To make lawyering more accountable and transpar-
ent seems like a fair and sensible concern.  Paul Caron and
Rafael Gely have urged that approach
to legal education.  Their article end-
lessly invokes “accountability and
transparency.”11 What counts as suc-
cess in achieving greater accountabil-
ity and transparency, they concede, is
hard to define.12 Their solution is to
let a competitive market furnish the
answer.  
Caron and Gely are right in advis-
ing against the wholesale rejection of
measuring and ranking.  But without
a vigorous grasp of the law as a pro-
fession and of technology as a
process of commodification, account-
ability will be to customers and trans-
parency will be the rule of an infor-
mation-gathering machinery.  If the
profession becomes a business,
lawyers – traditionally counselors – are in danger of becoming
business agents.  When the law is seen as a business, the pro-
fession becomes “the legal marketplace” and “[w]hat lawyers
need to do is to open new legal markets…”13 They have to
find new niches, and such specialization splinters the profes-
sion and obscures the coherence and importance of justice –
securing rights and liberties and a space for genuine human
flourishing.  
For a profession, accountability is as much for something as
it is to someone.  For lawyers that something is justice.  Since
technology advances unevenly, there are still significant areas
and incidents where rights and liberties are abridged, or
reversed, or simply unavailable.  Vigorous action and some-
times heroic efforts are undertaken by lawyers to liberate and
empower people.  There are in fact not enough lawyers to
meet these needs.
MUCH LAWYERING, of course, is devoted to the mainte-
nance of the technological machinery, and that too is a neces-
sary and commendable contribution to society.  But beyond
seeing to order and security, lawyers also work to support and
advance the dubious developments of technology.  The ques-
tionable character of the final commodities and of consump-
tion is usually concealed by the grandeur of the supporting
machineries.  It would be a grand thing to draw up the papers
for the merger of MacDonald’s and Burger King or for the
acquisition of one by the other.  But the sight of soft drinks
and hamburgers and of what they do to people is less impres-
sive. 
By any measure of mental, moral, or physical excellence,
our society on average is a decent, but not a good society.  Are
lawyers responsible for this deplorable state of affairs? In prin-
ciple no more so than any citizen.  But in fact lawyers are bet-
ter educated and more powerful than most people, and perhaps
an obligation goes with those privileges.  More directly,
lawyers are responsible for the culture of the law. It is widely
acknowledged that lawyers are relatively despondent in and
about their profession.14 Reforms are needed.  
THREE THINGS have to be understood if reforms
are to make sense and have a chance.
The first is to recognize cosmetic
reforms for what they are.  To pro-
vide concierge services, nanny emer-
gency services, to see to it that
“lawyers who work into the evenings
can have dinner delivered, on a silver
tray, from the Palm Restaurant,” to
have some consulting firm employ “a
battery of staff psychologists and
social workers to provide advice on
issues including stress, anxiety,
depression and divorce,“ all that  is
nothing more than gilding the cage as
long as law firms impose “pretty
strict hours,” cater “to their young
recruits’ wants and needs, while free-
ing them [sic] to bill 60 hours or
more a week,” and continue to “rais[e] minimum billable
hours over the years.”15
The perks may not be a problem for Montana lawyers, but
the tendency to work longer hours certainly is.  To work on
behalf of justice is to secure rights and liberties and a space for
human flourishing.  If that space keeps shrinking in the
lawyers’ own life and if what remains is filled with frenetic
and extravagant consumption, a shadow of perversion falls on
lawyering itself.  Here too lawyers do not bear a particular
responsibility.  All the elites in American society work injuri-
ously long, if not always productive, hours.  We have the para-
doxical situation where the best seem to accomplish every-
thing except living a good life.  
THE SECOND THING TO NOTICE is more subtle, but
no less important.  We have to understand that commodifica-
tion has removed the material constraints that once enforced
wholesome habits, and again not just in the law but across the
life of a community.  Walking miles, lifting things, handling
tools, working and keeping faith with your spouse, helping
neighbors, giving and getting the news in the town square –
these things were necessities of life.  So was the traditional, if
socially biased, comity of the law.  Commodification is not
going to stop any time soon.  Efforts at eradicating inefficien-
cies through more sophisticated machineries and procedures
will continue, and with the arrival of most every bit of stream-
lining a bit of tangibility and sanity will take its leave.  
What used to be supported by material necessity must there-
When the hauling of water
and putting pen to paper are
lifted from our shoulders,
the cultural texture of
‘women meeting at the well’
and the habit of  expressing
oneself in a unique hand are
torn apart.
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fore be reconstituted on moral
grounds and in a deliberate way.
That takes us to the third and last
condition of sensible reforms.
Attempts at reform on the part of
individual lawyers are bound to have
narrow limits.  Any one lawyer lives
in a world not of his or her making.
What’s needed is collective action in
restoring the culture of the law – at
the level of law schools, professional
corporations, and of the State Bar of
Montana.  I don’t know enough about
the practice of the law to be helpful
in specifics.  But the general task is
clear enough – lawyers have to recog-
nize and reject the rule, though not
the services, of technology ,and they
need to reconstitute the law as form
to the good life – as a good practice. 
SOME OF THE necessary elements are clear. One is to
secure the importance and integrity of face-to-face meetings.
Importance means that certain transactions, enumerated on a
list, are too important to be done electronically.  Arraignment
is an example.  Integrity means that the disrespect and distrac-
tion of people hiding their faces and activities behind the
screen of a laptop or in the BlackBerry stoop will not be toler-
ated.  If electronically available information is indispensable at
a meeting, it has to be restricted to some public display.  More
generally, face-to-face meetings, including lectures and semi-
nars in law schools, need to be protected from every kind of
electronic intrusion – phone calls, e-mails, text messages,
news, individual information retrievals, etc.  A more informal
but equally helpful way to reestablish and reinvigorate face-to-
face meetings is to provide readily accessible or, better,
unavoidable places of actual encounters and to give those
places the tangible charm and gracious character that we value
in persons.  
Depending on the authority of the collective body, measures
of reform have to take the shape of enforceable rules or of
strong recommendations.  Even the latter can be effective.  An
individual lawyer or two who at some meeting take offense at
their e-mailing or BlackBerrying colleagues will appear for-
lorn or priggish in asking for undivided attention.  They will
be in a stronger position if they are able to remind their col-
leagues of what the State Bar of Montana has strongly recom-
mended.  
No doubt reform proposals will be greeted with the obser-
vation that they may be desirable but are in fact unrealistically
expensive and not immediately realizable.  But the question is
this: Expensive in relation to what? The general poverty of this
country? Are we, as a society, struggling to vaccinate people
and put bread on the table?  We have to remember that the cul-
ture of technology is dedicated to commodification, that com-
modification serves consumption, and that for half a century
now the rising level of consumption has not been conducive to
greater human flourishing.  Hence to plead for more money on
behalf of greater justice, especially in the areas of the criminal
law and public interest, is a proposal
to reign in pointless affluence and a
plea for a better society.
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